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ABSTRACT
This study argues that the U.S. Air Force's current framework
for applying air power, termed the strategic bombing model, is
inappropriate for low-intensity conflict (LIC) . It outlines this
model and traces the application of strategic bombing principles,
by American air campaign planners, in every major conflict involving
air power since World War II. This study then describes how two
characteristics of the LIC environment undermine the strategic
bombing model: (1) the vital "center of gravity" in LIC is socio-
political in nature, it is not embodied in the enemy's leadership
element; and (2) the traditional targets for a strategic bombing
campaign are too diffuse and abstract within a LIC scenario to be
attacked effectively by air power. This study proposes an
alternative framework for the application of military force in LIC
operations that addresses these aspects of the LIC environment. It
outlines the proper role for air power within this "new" framework.
This study notes that the effective employment of air power in LIC
relies more on the airplane's ability to support ground operations
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As a result of changing international and domestic
environments, the American military establishment is
undergoing an important reevaluation of its force structure
and doctrine. These decisions are of unparalleled importance
because of the nature of the military drawdown. Decisions
made in the near future about how the armed forces operate are
going to have a lasting impact. Mistakes are going to be
extremely costly and are not going to be easily corrected.
The Air Force has undergone a structural reorganization in an
attempt to "streamline" its operations, but has given little
attention to the need for doctrinal change and a force
structure tailored to the future security environment.
The primary tenet of the current framework for employing
air power, termed strategic bombing is: an enemy has certain
"centers of gravity" which, when destroyed, degrade his
ability to wage war. Strategic bombing advocates envision a
series of concentric rings representing an enemy's centers of
gravity. Air power provides a tool that allows the commander
to attack whatever ring he deems appropriate for the situa-
tion.
The genesis for the concept of strategic bombing is the
inter-war writing of Italian air strategist Giulio Douhet
.
American air campaign planners have employed Douhet '
s
vii
principles in every major conflict involving air power since
World War II. Air power advocates have adamantly maintained
the efficacy of strategic bombing even when faced with its
limitations. The Desert Storm air campaign served as an
ultimate validation of the concept of strategic bombing.
Low-intensity conflict will play an increasingly larger
part in the security picture emerging in the wake of the Cold
War. Strategic bombing is an inappropriate framework for
employing air assets in low-intensity operations. Two
characteristics of low-intensity environment undermine the
strategic bombing model: (1) the vital center of gravity in
low-intensity conflict is social-political in nature, it is
not embodied in the enemy's leadership element; and (2) the
traditional targets for a strategic air campaign are too
diffuse and abstract within a low-intensity scenario to be
attacked effectively by air power.
While the proper employment of air assets in a low-
intensity conflict will look quite different than their use in
a conventional environment, air power can make a vital
contribution to low-intensity operations. To do so, air
power's application must focus more on the airplane's ability
to support ground operations and less on its capability to
carry and drop ordnance. As discussed in the body of this
study, air power has five primary missions in low-intensity
VI 11
operations: reconnaissance and surveillance; psychological
operations; maintenance of air lines of communication; close




In November 1992, Americans elected a new president, Bill
Clinton, as a signal of their concern for the state of the
U.S. economy. Increasing foreign trade imbalances and a
towering domestic budget deficit are now seen as the primary
threat to U.S. national interests. For some policymakers,
cutting the overall defense budget to produce a "peace
dividend" is President Clinton's primary tool to deal with
American economic woes. 1
As a result of the changing domestic environment, the
American military establishment is undergoing a painful and
important reevaluation of its force structure and doctrine.
In particular, the U.S. Air Force has announced a massive,
structural reorganization which seeks to "streamline" its
operations. 2 The services are also locked in battle to
protect their respective roles in various Department of
Defense (DOD) missions. Air Force leadership believes that
many of the proposals contained in the Chairman of the Joint
1. Rick Maze, "Even More Defense Cuts Urged," Air Force
Times, 1 March 1993, p. 3.
2. For a discussion o'f the reorganization "philosophy"
see James W. Canaan, "One Base, One Wing, One Boss, " Air Force
Magazine, August 1991, pp. 17-19.
Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions
of the Armed Forces of the United States (February 19 93)
impinge on the domain of Air Force assets. 3 While the Air
Force is going through the motions of restructuring in
reaction to the edicts of the President and Congress, it is
also fighting to capture as much of a shrinking defense budget
as it can for itself. However, the Air Force has given little
attention to the need for creative doctrinal change to meet
the new international security environment.
Containment of communism and deterrence of Soviet aggres-
sion are no longer seen as the primary tenets of our national
security strategy. Proliferation of nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons, drug trafficking, democratization, and
international political, military and economic interdependence
are the primary forces shaping U.S. security strategy. 4 The
new international community, with its emphasis on open borders
and free markets, provides an environment in which the
insurgent, the terrorist, and the drug trafficker can operate
with more freedom than ever before. As international interde-
pendence grows, a given source of instability will produce
3. See Neff Hudson, "Air Force Would Lose 'Copters Under
Plan," Air Force Times, 1 February 19 93, p. 10. and Julie
Bird, "Air Force Would Share Air Defense Mission, " Air Force
Times, 1 March 1993, p. 6.
4. National Military Strategy of the United States
(Washington, DC: The Pentagon, January 1992), p. 1.
effects within a wider and wider circle of influence. Given
the stated U.S. commitment to a more open international
system5 and rising American dependence on other countries for
products ranging from raw material to finished goods, the low-
intensity threat presents itself as an increasingly important
factor in the U.S. security picture.
In response to the changing domestic and international
environments of the late 1980s, the Air Force issued a "new"
philosophy of operations termed Global Reach- -Global Power. 6
This new posture entails CONUS-based aircraft reacting to
flashpoints as they occur throughout the world (global reach)
with concentrated firepower (global power) . This concept
combines traditional views about the employment of air power
with the political and economic realities of operating with
less forward presence. It is an attempt to apply Cold War
weapon systems and tactics to a new security environment where
threats are more diffuse, less tangible, and must be managed
with a shrinking support base.
5. National Security Strategy of the United States
(Washington, DC: The White House, August 1991), pp. 2-4.
6. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, The Air
Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach- -Global Power
(Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, June 1990)
.
Such a reliance on conventional doctrine in a world where
unconventional conflict will play a greater role in determin-
ing the U.S. security posture is a mistake. The nature of
conflict is changing and our doctrine needs to reflect this
change. This study takes a critical look at the current
framework for employing air power. It argues that this
framework, although quite effective in conventional warfare,
is inappropriate for one particular aspect of the emerging
security picture--low-inten'sity conflict (LIC) . It outlines
the underlying assumptions of this framework and explains why
they do not apply to the LIC environment. It presents an
alternative framework, better suited to the unique
characteristics of LIC operations and discusses the proper
role for air power in this environment.
Chapter one examines the Air Force's current framework for
the application of air power. This framework is termed the
strategic bombing model. The model presented in this study
exists in a myriad of Air Force professional military
education (PME) publications. 7 According to the model, air
power's proper application .is to attack strategic targets by
dropping bombs on them--hence the label strategic bombing.
7. For example see Col John A. Warden III, "The Key to
Success in War," in Force Employment, ed. by Capt Stephen L.
Huffman (Maxwell AFB, AL : Squadron Officer School, Air
University, 1992), pp. 2110-R-l - 2110-R-5.
The second chapter opens with an examination of the
genesis of strategic bombing- -Giulio Douhet's treatise The
Command of the Air. It then traces the application of strate-
gic bombing principles by American air campaign planners in
every major conflict involving air power since World War II.
The chapter points out that air power advocates have main-
tained the efficacy of strategic bombing even when faced with
its limitations.
Chapter three begins with a description of the changing
international security environment. It stresses that low-
intensity conflict is becoming increasingly relevant to the
American security milieu. The chapter then points out why the
strategic bombing model is inappropriate for operations in the
low-intensity environment.
Chapter four presents a more appropriate framework for
employing military force in LIC. It then outlines the proper
role for air power within this framework. This discussion
points out that the effective employment of air power in LIC
relies more on the airplane's ability to support ground
operations than its capability to carry and drop ordnance.
II. STRATEGIC BOMBING
This chapter examines the framework, or paradigm, for the
application of air power that American air strategists employ
in all conflict--strategic bombing. The primary tenet of
strategic bombing--that an enemy has certain "centers of
gravity" which, when destroyed, degrade his ability to wage
war--originates in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz. 8
Strategic bombing advocates argue that every adversary can be
characterized by a series of concentric rings which represent
his centers of gravity. Air power provides a tool that allows
the commander to attack whatever ring he deems appropriate for
the situation.
A. CENTERS OF GRAVITY
Strategic bombing is based on a definition of centers of
gravity that is the extrapolation of an idea expressed by
Clausewitz in Book Eight of On War:
Success is not due simply to general causes. Particular
factors can often be decisive--details only known to those
who were on the spot. There can also be moral factors
which never come to light; while issues can be decided by
8. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans, and ed. by
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976).
chances and incidents so minute as to figure in histories
simply as anecdotes.
What the theorist has to say here is this: one must
keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in
mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of
gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on
which everything depends
.
_ That is the point against which
all our energies should be directed [emphasis added]
.
Small things always depend on great ones, unimportant on
important, accidentals on essentials. This must guide our
approach. 9
An enemy's center of gravity, then, is the point (or points)
where he is most vulnerable to attack. 10 Thus, any applica-
tion of military force has the greatest chance of being deci-
sive when it is directed against an enemy's center (s) of
gravity.
This definition of center of gravity combines two princi-
ples of war: mass and economy of force. Mass is defined as
the concentration of combat power at the decisive time and
place. 11 Economy of force is the creation of usable mass by
using minimum combat power on secondary objectives and, by the
9. Ibid., pp. 595-596.
10. This interpretation of Clausewitz's use of the term
is not entirely correct. However, this is how Air Force and
Army doctrinaires define and use the term. See James J.
Schneider and Lt Col Lawrence L. Izzo, "Clausewitz's Elusive
Center of Gravity," Parameters, September 1987, pp. 46-57.
11. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine
of the United States Air Force (Washington, DC: Department of
the Air Force, March 1992), II, 11.
fullest use of all forces available. 12 Thus, for the
commander to take full advantage of an enemy's centers of
gravity, he must first identify them correctly. Then he must
commit his forces to the destruction of the enemy's centers of
gravity without sacrificing part of his forces to secondary
objectives. In this manner, commanders employing the
strategic bombing model expect to "bring any war to a quick
and decisive conclusion by striking an enemy's vital cen-
ters . " n
B. THE STRATEGIC BOMBING MODEL
Air campaign planners categorize potential targets
according to a hierarchy of five concentric, strategic
rings. 14 Each ring represents a center of gravity. The
model ranks these centers of gravity according to their levels
of decisiveness. The most vital center--leadership--lies at
the heart of the model. Surrounding this core is a second
ring depicting essential production facilities. The third
ring represents key infrastructure. The civilian populace
makes up the fourth ring. Surrounding the band of population
12. Ibid.
13. Col Dennis M. Drew, "Shooting Missions No Longer an
Either/Or Choice," Air Force Times, 21 June 1993, p. 31.
14. See Figure 1.
Figure 1. The Strategic Bombing Model
are fielded military forces. Commanders select the appropri-
ate ring (or rings) to be targeted based on consideration of
specific political-military objectives, disposition of enemy
and friendly forces, and accessibility of targets.
1 . Leadership
According to the strategic bombing model, leadership
is the most vital center of gravity. Colonel John Warden
explains that, "it is the only element of the enemy- -whether
a civilian at the seat of government or a general directing a
fleet--that can make concessions." 15 Actually killing or
overthrowing the existing enemy government is usually not the
desired end of a strategic bombing campaign. It is neither
necessary nor realistic to attempt to do so. Instead, the
purpose of strategic bombing is to convince the enemy leader-
ship to end the conflict because further action is impossible
and concessions are appropriate (or force it do so by physi-
cally depriving it of the means to wage war)
.
Most likely, and practicable, is the generation of
sufficient political pressure for the enemy leadership to
submit to the intended political objectives of the military
15. Col John A. Warden III, "Employing Air Power in the
Twenty-first Century, " in The Future of Air Power in the
Aftermath of the Gulf War, eds . Richard H. Schultz, Jr. and
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University
Press, July 1992), p. 65.
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operation. This was the objective achieved by the nuclear
strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II.
Killing the victims of these attacks was not the ultimate goal
of the application of force. In this case, the additional
political pressure brought to bear on the Japanese leadership
by the two nuclear strikes proved sufficient to accelerate its
capitulation to Allied demands for surrender. 16
The campaign planner can also target the enemy leader-
ship ring by attacking its command and control (C 2 ) capabil-
ity. Taking away the enemy's ability to operate its own
military forces by destroying C 2 facilities with air power
leaves it unable to defend itself from further attack and more
likely to comply with political demands. For example, one of
the first targets destroyed by coalition bombers during the
Operation Desert Storm air campaign was the Iraqi telephone
system. This network was Saddam Hussein's primary means of
communication with, and control of, his military forces. 1
16. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary
Report (Pacific War) (1 July 1946; rpt . Maxwell AFB, AL : Air
University Press, October 1987), p. 106.
17. Warden, "Employing Air Power," p. 70.
11
2 . Production
Attacking the second strategic ring entails targeting
the enemy's military-related industries, key utility facili-
ties (e.g., electric generating plants and oil refineries), or
its access to external sources of these commodities if they
are not produced internally. Applying pressure to the
production target ring produces two effects that are militari-
ly desirable. First, enemy capability to employ and/or
produce military hardware is degraded. Second, life, for the
country's citizens, is made increasingly difficult, generating
internal political pressure to end the conflict.
Destroying an enemy's military order of battle in the
field is the least efficient means of degrading his capability
to wage war. Strategic bombing enthusiasts maintain that
using air power to strike the factories that produce,
assemble, or support this order of battle is more cost-effec-
tive. They also affirm that this technique is more decisive
since the capability to replace equipment is also diminished.
Related targets include facilities that produce fuel or other
go ds required to employ this equipment in the field. During
World War II, Allied bombers began targeting German oil
production facilities in May of 1944. As a result, Germany's
consumption of fuel exceeded production for the remainder of
the war. In fact, attacks on oil refineries were so crippling
12
to the Germans that they had to plan on the seizure of Allied
fuel stores to carry out the doomed Ardennes offensive at
year's end. 18
Disruption of a country's fuel and utility infrastruc-
ture also has a profound impact upon the civilian population,
particularly in modern, urbanized states. The cessation of
normal access to gasoline and electricity for lighting,
heating, and cooking in their homes serves as a constant
reminder to civilians of the conflict in which their leader-
ship has them embroiled. The strategic bombing model assumes
that existing dissent will be amplified under these condi-
tions. Eventually, even the most popular regime will begin to
suffer criticism if these conditions persist and it remains
unable to do anything to remedy them.
3 . Infrastructure
The third most vital category of targets is the
enemy's transportation and communication networks. Targets
include highways, railroads, canals, airports, and port
facilities as well as telegraph lines, satellite up-links, and
radio and television stations. The transportation and
communication systems of most modern states present the
18. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary
Report (European War) (30 September 1945; rpt . Maxwell AFB,
AL: Air University Press, October 1987), pp. 20-23.
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campaign planner with an abundance of potential targets. To
increase the effectiveness of attacking an enemy's infra-
structure, planners target its hubs, junctions, and critical
nodes (e.g., rail yards, interchanges, and bridges) . Like the
destruction of production-related targets, targeting infra-
structure degrades the enemy's capability to fight and imposes
hardship upon the civilian populace.
Transportation of troops, supplies, and equipment is
necessary to military operations. By denying the enemy the
means to carry out this mission, air power isolates and
exposes enemy forces. This state of affairs decreases troop
morale, weakens enemy forces physically, and increases the
relative effectiveness of friendly firepower. During the
Korean War, from May to July 1951, Air Force, Marine Corps and
Navy bombers engaged in Operation Strangle. Designed to
augment and support an Eighth Army offensive, Operation
Strangle targeted the seven major Chinese Army supply routes
between railheads on the 39th parallel and the front lines.
During the Eighth Army's offensive, air power brought traffic
on these critical resupply arteries to a standstill. These
efforts weakened and demoralized Chinese troops and improved
the morale and effectiveness of United Nations (UN) forces. 19
19. Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in
Korea, 1950-1953 , revised ed. (Washington, DC: Office of Air
Force History, 1983), pp.. 324-325, 437. For a different
14
The strategic bombing model presumes that the destruc-
tion of highways, airports, and waterways takes a toll on the
civilian population as well. Fresh produce and other goods
brought into cities from rural areas become scarce and
extremely expensive. The ability to move freely about one's
own country is also lost. Civilians desiring refuge in remote
regions are forced to stay in built-up areas, increasing their
frustration. The loss of commercial telecommunications
networks results in disorientation. The lack of timely news
about the status of the conflict generates anxiety. Overall,
the loss of mobility and information, through destruction of
the state's infrastructure, creates discomfort for the
civilian populace, leading to political pressure on the
government to terminate the conflict and relieve the situa-
tion .
4. Population
Not since World War II have air campaign planners
considered directly targeting people (the fourth strategic
ring) . As Colonel Warden attests, "Moral objections aside, it
is difficult to attack the population directly because targets
are too numerous and in many cases--especially in a police
estimation of Operation Strangle' s effectiveness see
M.J. Armitage & R.A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age,
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 35-36.
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state--the population may be willing to suffer grievously
before it will turn on its own government." 20 However,
campaign planners still consider indirect attacks on the
population viable. These indirect attacks target civilian
morale
.
Destruction of the state's production capabilities and
infrastructure place an enormous amount of stress upon the
general populace. Additionally, the destruction of purely
military targets can be accomplished in a manner which
influences civilian morale. Lieutenant General Charles
Horner, Desert Storm's Air Component Commander, stated that he
scheduled night-time strikes against military targets near
urban areas to remind Iraqis that a war was being fought and
Saddam Hussein was powerless to contain it. 21
5 . Fielded Forces
There is a certain logic to the belief that enemy
armed forces are the most important target for any air
campaign. However, the strategic bombing model treats
military forces as nothing more than a means to protect one's
own centers of gravity (or to threaten those of an enemy)
.
Colonel Warden states that fielded forces are considered vital
20. Warden, "Employing Air Power," p. 66.
21. Julie Bird, "Horner: Further AF Role in Gulf Not
Needed," Air Forces Times, 18 March 1991, p. 8.
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only because, "One can persuade a state to make concessions by
reducing its fielded military forces. Indeed if all of its
fielded forces are destroyed, it may have to make the ultimate
concession simply because the command element knows that its
inner rings have become defenseless and open to destruc-
tion." 22 The Desert Storm air campaign stands out as perhaps
the most decisive application of air power ever used against
an enemy's fielded forces. Prior to initiation of any ground
offensive, coalition air power pounded the Iraqi defense lines
for 40 days. As Major Mark Clodfelter colorfully described
the effects of the sustained air attack, "The Iraqi army had
become an eggshell that cracked once it was tapped by advanc-
ing allied ground forces." 23 But, no matter how effective it
may be, the use of air assets to destroy enemy military equip-
ment directly (on the front) is much more expensive than
destroying it at or near its source of production. Since the
purpose of a strategic bombing campaign is to bring the
conflict to a favorable resolution as soon as possible,
attacking the enemy's least vital center of gravity is the
strategic bombing advocate's last choice.
22. Warden, "Employing Air Power," p. 67.
23. Maj Mark Clodfelter, "Of Demons, Storms, and
Thunder: A Preliminary Look at Vietnam's Impact on the Persian
Gulf Air Campaign," Airpower Journal, Winter 1991, p. 27.
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C. APPLICATION
Strategic bombing disciples assert that the airplane's
ability to avoid geographic and military obstacles and deliver
ordnance onto a target makes it the ideal platform to attack
enemy centers of gravity. The first step in any strategic
bombing campaign is attainment of air superiority. Once
allowed to operate freely over enemy territory, air assets can
focus on the destruction of vital targets in the most effi-
cient manner. Target selection is based upon the intended
political objectives of military action, the disposition of
enemy and friendly armed forces, and target access.
1. Air Superiority-
Gaining the ability to operate one's aircraft without
opposition is the first step in waging a campaign of strategic
bombing. According to Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1:
Aerospace control normally should be the first priority of
aerospace forces. Aerospace control permits aerospace and
surface forces to operate more effectively and denies
these advantages to the enemy. Absolute control of the
environment is the ideal aim of aerospace control opera-
tions . 24
Air power proponents maintain that attempting to accomplish
tasks secondary to air superiority without first achieving it
24. AFM 1-1, I, 10.
18
is a dangerous diversion of resources. 26 The first targets
attacked in any strategic bombing campaign are air superiori-
ty, or counterair, targets. Even during the small-scale
application of strategic bombing, during Operation El Dorado
Canyon (Libya, 1986), the first air strikes were designed to
achieve a level of air superiority sufficient to accomplish
the major objectives of the mission. 26
Counterair operations entail the destruction and/or
neutralization of enemy aircraft and ground-based air defense
weapons (i.e., anti-aircraft artillery [AAA] and surface-to-
air missiles [SAM]).^ 7 Counterair targets also include the
warning and control systems which support these weapons (e.g.,
radar sites and command posts) as well as the infrastructure
necessary to operate and maintain them (e.g., depots and air-
fields) . Air and ground assets can be employed to attack
these targets directly. For example, during the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) employed both naval
25. Ibid., II, 142 and Col John A. Warden III, The Air
Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 1988), pp. 17-18, 99, 161.
26. White House Statement - April 14, 1986, "U.S. Exer-
cises Right of Self-Defense Against Libyan Terrorism,
"
Department of State Bulletin, June 1986, p. 1.
27. For a detailed study of ground-based air defense
systems and their impact on air operations see Kenneth P.
Werrell, Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM (Maxwell AFB, AL : Air
University Press, December 1988)
.
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and ground assets to destroy Egyptian SAM sites. 28 Campaign
planners can also choose to defeat counterair weapon systems
without actually destroying them. Many airframes in the USAF
inventory carry on-board electronic countermeasure (ECM)
equipment designed to degrade enemy defenses and attain a




A thorough discussion of the connection between
political and military objective is too extensive to accom-
plish here. 29 Objectives are addressed here to highlight the
fact that target selection for a broad strategic bombing
campaign is contingent upon the intended political-military
goals of the application of military force.
The commander establishes military objectives based on
the political objectives of the application of air power. The
campaign planner then tailors target lists to meet military
objectives. If the intent is total annihilation of the enemy
state, then all five strategic rings will be struck, probably
28. See Warden, The Air Campaign, p. 19 and Armitage &
Mason, p. 134 respectively.
29. For an excellent discussion of this topic see Col
Dennis M. Drew & Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy: An
Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems
(Maxwell AFB, AL : Air University Press, August 1988).
20
with nuclear weapons. The most significant objective yet to
be attempted with a campaign of strategic bombing was the
unconditional surrender of Axis powers during World War II.
In a scenario for unconditional surrender, planners target the
production and infrastructure rings of the strategic bombing
model. The desired two-fol'd result of attacking these rings
is degradation of the enemy's war-fighting capability and
disintegration of its will to continue the conflict. If the
use of military force is designed to send the message that a
certain action by the enemy will not be tolerated, then only
one or two rings might be struck. Usually, ring five is the
target of choice because striking military targets tends to
generate less international criticism. In an even lower level
of conflict, air assets might engage in gunboat diplomacy30
in which no ordnance is actually dropped. Fly-overs or
exercises designed to demonstrate resolve target rings one and
four. They "attack" the psyche of the leadership and civilian
population of the affected state. The extent to which an
enemy's centers of gravity are attacked will be in direct
proportion to the level of behavior modification required by
the political demands on the enemy.
30. Gunboat diplomacy is defined as the demonstration,
threat, or use of limited force for political objectives. See
Robert Mandel, "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy,"
International Studies Quarterly, March 1986, p. 60.
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3. Disposition of Forces
According to strategic bombing disciples, air power
can resolve any conflict without the introduction or use of
surface forces. However, if the enemy decides to threaten
friendly centers of gravity on the ground, or the United
States is drawn into a conflict that already involves surface
battles, then air power can be applied to interdict enemy
forces and support friendly operations.
According to AFM 1-1, "Interdiction disrupts, delays,
or destroys an enemy's military potential before it can be
used against friendly forces." 31 Air assets assume the
interdiction role only when there is credible evidence that
enemy military force is going to be used against friendly
centers of gravity. Interdiction missions attack military-
related targets in the enemy's first, second, and third
strategic rings. The intent of interdiction is to block the
enemy from using military force before friendly centers of
gravity suffer damage. 'Interdiction is a preventative
measure
.
Once enemy forces engage friendly centers of gravity
directly, air assets are used for close-air support missions.
Close air involves the direct destruction of enemy troops and
equipment (ring five) . The most common form of close air
31. AFM 1-1, I, 12
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mission is in support of friendly troops engaged in combat
with enemy forces.
Strategic bombing advocates consider forcing enemy
leadership to concede to friendly political demands to be air
power's primary mission. However, they recognize (and assert)
that air assets can provide protection for friendly centers of
gravity when the situation warrants. Air power provides this
protection through interdiction and close-air support mis-
sions .
4. Accessibility
The final element of target selection is the accessi-
bility of individual targets. Two factors determine which
targets can be reached by air power: capability and authoriza-
tion. The commander must possess both the necessary resources
and valid authorization to strike any given target.
The capability to attack a target depends on the
characteristics of available airframes and the nature of the
target to be struck. Obviously, to carry out any mission, an
aircraft must be able to carry the required bomb load and
possess the range to arrive over the target, but the ordnance
available must be suited to the target as well. During the
Desert Storm air campaign, many targets were destroyed only
because coalition air forces possessed specially designed
23
laser-guided and penetrating munitions. 32 If enemy targets
lay outside the operating radius of friendly aircraft, or are
sufficiently hardened to resist damage from available muni-
tions, they cannot be destroyed.
Commanders must also have the necessary authority to
strike enemy targets. In almost every conflict involving air
power, civilian leadership has restricted American air
commanders from bombing certain areas for political, diplomat-
ic, or moral reasons. For instance, during the bombing of
North Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson maintained rigid
control over which targets could be attacked, personally
approving strike lists on a week-to-week basis. 33 The debate
over whether this form of control is proper is not relevant to
this discussion. What is important is that authorization
affects target selection.
Target selection in strategic bombing campaigns is
subject to the following constraints: objectives, disposition
of forces, and access. Campaign planners design target lists
to accomplish the commander's stated military objectives. The
strategic bombing model presumes that by applying pressure to
32. See Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power
and the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution
Press, 1992), pp. 303-307. .
33. See Maj Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The
American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York, NY: The Free
Press, 1989), pp. 85, 87-88.
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the enemy's centers of gravity, air power can be used to gain
the enemy leadership's concession to political demands.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter outlined the strategic bombing model. The
primary assumption of strategic bombing is that an enemy has
certain centers of gravity which, when destroyed, degrade his
capability and will to wage war. Campaign planners employ a
model of concentric rings representing an enemy's centers of
gravity. Targets are selected, from these categories, to
accomplish the commander's stated military objectives.
Military objectives are established to achieve the broader
political goals of the use of military force.
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III. THE DOCTRINAL INERTIA OF STRATEGIC BOMBING
This chapter demonstrates the degree to which strategic
bombing is entrenched in the minds of American airmen. It
opens with an examination of Giulio Douhet ' s treatise The
Command of the Air. It then traces the application of strate-
gic bombing principles, by American air campaign planners, in
every major conflict involving air power since World War II.
The chapter points out how air power advocates have adamantly
maintained the efficacy of strategic bombing even when faced
with its failures.
A . DOUHET
Air power historians widely accept the idea that Giulio
Douhet ' s The Command of the Air is the genesis of the modern
strategic bombing model. 34 Among Douhet ' s major assertions
were: (1) modern war will be total war, involving the civilian
34. For example see Maj Perry M. Smith, "Douhet and
Mitchell: Some Reappraisals," Air University Review, Septem-
ber-October 1967, pp. 97-101; Lee B. Kennett, A History of
Strategic Bombing (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1982), pp. 54-57; Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, 2nd
ed., trans, by Dino Ferrari, ed. by Richard H. Kohn & Joseph
P. Harahan (1927; rpt . Washington, DC: Office of Air Force
History, 1983), pp. vii-x; and Lt Col Barry D. Watts, The
Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine : The Problem of Friction in
War (Maxwell AFB, AL : Air University Press, December 1984),
p. 5.
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populace as well as military forces; (2) air power will be the
primary factor in modern war; and (3) air superiority is a
prerequisite for an effective air campaign.
Douhet wrote The Command of the Air shortly after the end
of World War I. The horror and waste of static, trench
warfare convinced Douhet that another means must be devised to
achieve victory--one which would bring a much swifter end to
the fighting. Douhet proposed that the way to win quickly was
to avoid the enemy's fielded forces completely. Instead, one
should attack directly the enemy's capability to supply and
maintain them. Left without a credible defense, the enemy
state would soon loose its will to continue the confrontation.
Urbanization of the modern state meant that destruction of the
enemy's capability to wage war would affect the civilian
population as well. Douhet believed that modern conflict
would take on "a character of national totality [because] the
entire population and all the resources of a nation are sucked
into the maw of war." 35
Douhet maintained that the severe losses of the first
World War were caused by an emphasis on defense. To implement
his new strategy military thinkers had to stress offensive
operations. Douhet claimed that the aircraft permitted this
revolutionary change, "Because of its independence of surface
35. Douhet, p. 5
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limitations and its superior speed--superior to any other
known means of transportation--the airplane is the offensive
weapon par excellence." 36 To Douhet, the essence of future
war-fighting was a nation's offensive bombing capability.
Surface forces were auxiliary forces, necessary only to
protect the nation from enemy ground and naval forces. Air
Force bombers were the single military element that would
determine the outcome of the war effort. Douhet argued that
since air power was the heart of a nation's defense-through-
offense, it followed that a nation stood no chance of victory
in war if its Air Force was less capable than that of its
enemies
:
To be defeated in the air. . .is finally to be defeated and
to be at the mercy of the enemy, with no chance at all of
defending oneself, compelled to accept whatever terms he
sees fit to dictate. 37
From this assumption, Douhet developed his thesis for the
necessity of air superiority-- "command of the air."
Douhet ' s perception of air superiority differed from that
of today's airmen because effective ground-based air defenses
had not been developed. However, his definition is quite
similar to that of modern doctrine:
36. Ibid.
, p. 15
37. Ibid., p. 23
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To have command of the air means to be in a position to
prevent the enemy from flying while retaining the ability
to fly oneself. 38
Douhet recognized that the quickest way to deny the enemy use
of the air was through counterair operations. He maintained
that counterair targets were the first priority in war, but it
was the make-up of a nation's Air Force itself that was the
only guarantee of command of the air. The Air Force had to
maintain sufficient "units of bombardment" to destroy the war-
fighting capability of its strongest enemy. Units of bombard-
ment could be determined by measuring the surface area of
enemy targets, computing the amount of ordnance required to
level this area, and calculating the number of airframes
sufficient to deliver this payload. 3 ' To ensure that bombers
would arrive at their destinations, the Air Force also had to
maintain sufficient "units of combat." The function of combat
units was to defeat any enemy aerial opposition. The required
units of combat were determined in a manner similar to units
of bombardment starting with the number of pursuit aircraft in
the enemy's inventory. 40 Only by maintaining an Air Force
large enough to prevail in a conflict with the nation's stron-
gest enemy could command of the air be ensured.
38. Ibid., p. 24.
39. Ibid.
, pp.. 35-41
40. Ibid., pp. 41-46
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Douhet ' s ideas about using aircraft to attack enemy war-
fighting capability and will-power planted the seeds for
strategic bombing. His assertion, that planners could deter-
mine the minimal force required to win any war with air power,
lead to the hierarchical categorization of targets that is the
strategic bombing model. American air strategists employed
Douhet ' s principles at their very first opportunity—World
War II.
B. AWPD-1
On August 4, 1941, General Henry H. Arnold, Deputy Chief
of Staff for Air of the Army, assigned the Air War Plans
Division (AWPD) the task of designing an air campaign against
Germany and Japan. The four member task force chosen to
compose the plan was made up of former instructors from the
Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field, Alabama. 41
The ACTS was the Air Corps' first formal school of air power
doctrine and employment. David Maclsaac, air power historian,
summed up the school's fundamental theory of air power:
the most efficient way to defeat an enemy is to destroy,
by means of bombardment from the air, his war-making
41. Col Harold L. George, Lt Col Kenneth Walker, Major
Laurence S. Kuter, and Major Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. made up
the AWPD's planning- team. Haywood S. Hansell. Jr., The Air
Plan that Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, GA: Higgins-McArthur,
Longino & Porter, Inc., 1972), pp. 60, 69-70.
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capacity; the means to this end is to identify by scien-
tific analysis those particular elements of his war
potential the elimination of which will cripple either his
war machine or his will to continue the conflict; these
elements having been identified, they should be attacked
by large masses of bombardment aircraf t . . . . such bombing
missions having been carried out, the enemy, regardless of
his strength in armies and navies, will lack the means to
support continued military action. 42
This set of assumptions was the foundation for the AWPD's plan
for the air war against the Axis powers.
AWPD's strategy called for first knocking Germany out of
the war. Only then could air power focus on the Pacific
theater. The campaign plan developed to defeat Germany was
known as AWPD-1. It consisted of a list of 154 targets
divided into four categories: (1) German electric power; (2)
German transportation systems; (3) German oil and petroleum
production complexes and sources; and (4) German fighter
defenses. 43 The AWPD noted that overcoming Germany's aerial
defenses was an intermediate step to attaining the "optimum
effectiveness" of the campaign plan. 44 AWPD planners even
determined the exact numbers of airplanes and crewmembers
needed to carry out the campaign. 45 The proponents of AWPD-1
42. David Maclsaac, Strategic Bombing in World War Two:
The Story of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (New
York, NY: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1976), p. 7.
43. Hansell, pp. 80-88.
44. Ibid.
, p. 80.
45. Ibid., p. 88.
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maintained that within six months the air campaign would, by
itself, force the Germans to capitulate to Allied demands.
However, unfavorable weather conditions, severe losses to
German fighters, and the inability to determine the bombings'
impact on German war-fighting capability all contributed to a
significant degradation of the air campaign's effective-
ness. 46 Instead, it took over four years to bring about
Germany's surrender.
Strategic bombing disciples attributed the campaign's
limited effectiveness in the European theater primarily to:
(1) the diversion of air assets to support ground operations,
and (2) problems delivering* sufficient airframes and crews to
Great Britain. 47 For whatever reasons, strategic bombing was
unable achieve victory through the use of air power alone and
the question of air power's contributions in Europe is still
debated. Air power advocates point to the following lines
from the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey for vindication of
their belief in the strategic bombing model:
Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western
Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have
46. For a thorough discussion of the impact of these
factors on Allied bombing efforts see Watts, pp. 60-85.
47. See Hansell, pp. 256-258.
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been employed differently or better in some respects.
Nevertheless, it was decisive. 48
A realistic appraisal acknowledges that air power provided a
vital contribution to Germany's defeat, but victory could not




In the five years between the end of World War II and the
Korean War, the Air Corps gained its independence. It
appeared that the new Air Force, free from Army oversight,
could now pursue and employ a pure doctrine of strategic
bombing. The Air Force would not find this freedom during the
Korean conflict.
When American bombers were first ordered to the Korean
theater, the Air Force possessed no off-the-shelf plan for an
air campaign against North Korea. 49 The Directorate of
Intelligence at Strategic Air Command (SAC) immediately went
to work drafting a target list for such a campaign. True to
doctrine, the plan reflected the belief that destruction of
the enemy's war-fighting capability was the quickest means to
secure victory. It named five major industrial areas with 18
48. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary
Report (European War), p. 37.
49. Futrell, p. 186.
33
major targets as the centerpiece of a strategic bombing
campaign against North Korea. 50 Major General Emmet
t
O'Donnell, commander of Far East Air Forces' (FEAF) Bomber
Command, predicted that SAC ' s plan would end the conflict
within three months. 51
General MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) Target
Group took limited control over the FEAF's bombers immediately
upon their arrival in the Korean theater. When the GHQ Target
Group deemed it necessary, FEAF forces were required to halt
the strategic campaign and provide support for Eighth Army
operations. 52 For their first full month in theater, FEAF
bombers were diverted to fulfill GHQ's requests. Finally, on
8 August 1950, they began carrying out SAC's strategic bombing
campaign. By 2 6 September 1950, FEAF bombers destroyed all of
North Korea's significant military-related industry. 53 The
Air Force now focused on interdiction and close-air support
missions and waited for North Korea to fall.
50. Ibid, pp. 183-185.
51. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine;
Volume One: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force
1907-1960 (Maxwell AFB, AL : Air University Press, December
1989), pp. 294-295.
52. Futrell, USAF in Korea, p. 186.
53. FEAF bombers spared one oil storage facility because
of its proximity to the Soviet border. Ibid., pp. 187-195.
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North Korea was able to continue fighting, despite
destruction of its key industries, because the Chinese were
supplying its war efforts. Lacking authorization for strikes
across the Chinese border, FEAF bombers continued interdiction
and close-air support missions. 54 Frustration over the air
campaign's inability to end the conflict, coupled with the
Chinese intervention in November 1950, lead FEAF commanders to
protest the prohibition of air strikes against targets in
Manchuria. 5 " Not until 1952 did air commanders again find a
role that satisfied their desire to apply strategic bombing
principles
.
In January 1952, Brigadier General Jacob E. Smart became
the new FEAF Deputy Commander for Operations. Smart ordered
a new campaign plan that shifted the emphasis of targets
struck within North Korea:
Whenever possible, attacks will be scheduled against
targets of military significance so situated that their
destruction will have a deleterious effect upon the morale
of the civilian population actively engaged in the
logistic support of enemy forces [emphasis added]
.
5!
Smart determined that the time had come to target the enemy's
will to continue the conflict. At first the Army disagreed,
but when General Mark Clark took over as theater commander, in




56. Quoted in Clodfelter, Limits of Airpower, p. 17
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April, Smart received permission to implement his new strategy-
termed "air pressure." Clark agreed that an air pressure
campaign might be just the way to jump-start the faltering
armistice process. 57
The main targets for the air pressure campaign were a
series of irrigation dams which diverted water to North
Korea's vital rice crop. 5 * The timing of the air pressure
campaign matched a threat by President Eisenhower to escalate
the conflict by authorizing strikes in Manchuria and intro-
ducing nuclear weapons. 5 ' The Chinese soon agreed to terms
acceptable to American leadership. Air power advocates per-
ceived that the air pressure strategy, combined with the
threat of a truly unrestricted strategic bombing campaign, had
forced the Chinese to concede to American demands. 60
After the Korean War the Air Force vowed to never again
allow its primary mission to be obscured by secondary
objectives. The main lesson strategic bombing proponents took
57. Futrell, USAF in Korea, pp. 481-482, 489.
58. FEAF commanders claimec that only those dams which,
when destroyed, washed out major portions of nearby railroads
and/or highways would be struck. The FEAF feared that a
campaign which appeared to be targeting North Korea's means of
feeding itself would provide invaluable propaganda material to
the Communists. Ibid., pp. 666-669.
59. Clodfelter, Limits of Airpower, p. 23.
60. Futrell, USAF in Korea, p. 670.
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away from Korea's politically shackled air campaign was:
prohibitions against attacking the true source of the enemy's
war-fighting capability undermine the effect of air power. In
Senate hearings about the conduct of operations during the
Korean War, General George Stratmeyer, FEAF Commander until
June 1951, labeled political restrictions "un-American." 61
In his autobiography, General Curtis LeMay claimed that unre-
strained strikes against targets in Manchuria would have kept
the Chinese from protracting the war. 62 For strategic
bombing enthusiasts, the political restrictions placed on air
commanders explained why air power had not been acutely
decisive in Korea. This experience strengthened the resolve
of those who proclaimed a pure form of strategic bombing.
In the decade after the Korean War, the Air Force's
Strategic Air Command went through a rapid growth. SAC
consumed most of the Air Force budget as air strategists
focused on maximizing American strategic bombing capabili-
ty. 6 - Air Force leadership asserted that in the next con-
flict Tactical Air Command's (TAC) assets would be solely
responsible for carrying out interdiction and close-air
61. Quoted in Clodfelter, Limits of Airpower, p. 25.
62. Curtis E. LeMay with MacKinlay Kantor, Mission with




63. See Clodfelter, Limits of Airpower, pp. 26-37.
37
missions. 64 This would leave SAC s bombers free to focus on
air power's primary mission—destruction of the enemy's
capability and will. The Air Force entered the fray of




In early 1964, it became evident to American policy-makers
that the South Vietnamese government was rapidly losing its
ability to counter the Vietcong insurgency. In response,
President Johnson directed his military leadership to begin
drafting plans for possible American intervention to preserve
the South Vietnamese state. Both civilian and military
leaders viewed North Vietnamese political and logistical
support as vital to the Vietcong. 65 This was the primary-
assumption that drove the Air Force's contingency planning.
Air campaign planners believed that if North Vietnamese
support and direction was critical to the Vietcong, then it
was North Vietnamese war-fighting capability and will that
needed to be targeted. The Air Force refused to repeat the
"mistakes" of the Korean War. Throughout the spring and
64. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts , Doctrine, pp. 347-348.
65. Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development
of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War
(New York, NY: New York University Press, 1986), pp. 237-271.
summer of 1964, Air Force planners devised a target list for
a strategic air campaign against North Vietnam. The plan's
target list included 94 industrial facilities and key infra-
structure nodes. The strategic air campaign was designed to:
(1) reduce North Vietnamese support of communist operations in
Laos and South Vietnam, (2) limit North Vietnamese capabilit-
ies to take direct action against Laos and South Vietnam, and
(3) impair North Vietnam's capacity to continue as an indus-
trial state. bb Planners asserted that destruction of all 94
targets could (and should) be accomplished within sixteen days
of implementing the plan. 67 This plan was the blueprint for
the air campaign known as Rolling Thunder.
President Johnson gave tentative approval to the air
campaign in February 1965 and strikes began in March. bi
Operation Rolling Thunder continued for the next two-and-a-
half years. From the start, the Johnson administration
refused to permit a comprehensive campaign against all 94
targets for fear that a massive assault would invoke Chinese
or Soviet intervention. Instead, Rolling Thunder progressed
through several graduated phases in which different target
66. Quoted in Col Dennis M. Drew, Rolling Thunder 1965:
Anatomy of a Failure (Maxwell AFB, AL : Air University Press,
October 1986)
, p. 29 .
67. Clodfelter, Limits of Airpower, p. 76.
68. Ibid., pp. 59-63.
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categories were struck as the intended political-military
objectives of the campaign varied over time. 69 Throughout
the campaign air commanders continued to press for comprehen-
sive bombing of all targets. At the same time, however, they
maintained that air power was taking its toll on the North
Vietnamese ability and will to support the Vietcong.
When the Tet Offensive occurred on 30 January 1968,
American civilian and military leaders were stunned. The fact
that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese could carry out such a
massive operation belied assurances of Rolling Thunder's
effectiveness. In a frenzied attempt to wring some success
out of the air campaign, Johnson heightened the tempo of
bombing and varied the types of targets struck for another two
months. 70 But by March, Johnson called a halt to the
bombing
.
In 1972, President Nixon returned to strategic bombing as
a means to resolve the conflict in Vietnam. By this time
several factors had changed the nature of the conflict: (1)
Nixon no longer sought to preserve the South Vietnamese state,
he was concerned only with an honorable withdrawal of Ameri :an
forces from Vietnam; (2) the conflict had become a convention-
al war fought primarily by the North Vietnamese because the
69. Ibid., pp. 88-92, 92-102, 102-107
70. Ibid., pp. 102-107.
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Tet Offensive had decimateti the Vietcong; and (3) American
foreign policy-makers no longer feared intervention by China
or the Soviet Union. 71
The target list employed in the 1972 campaigns, known as
Linebacker I and II, was virtually the same as that drawn up
for Rolling Thunder. 72 However, unlike Rolling Thunder, the
Linebacker campaigns were comprehensive and continuous. 7
When the Linebacker campaigns succeeded in convincing the
North Vietnamese to sign a peace treaty acceptable to Nixon,
air power advocates once again proclaimed that strategic
bombing had saved the day. 74 In fact, Linebacker's relative
successes convinced many senior military and civilian leaders
that a comprehensive strategic bombing campaign could have won
the war in 1965. 75
71. Ibid., p. 148.
72. Ibid., p. 158.
73. Ibid., pp. 158-163, 184-190.
74. Ibid., p. 201.
75. Ibid., p. ix and Clodfelter, "Of Demons, Storms, and
Thunder, " pp. 9, 31.
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E. DESERT STORM
During the two decades following the Vietnam War, airmen
deliberated the real value of strategic bombing. 76 In three
major conflicts, strategic air campaigns had not been able to
achieve victory in the manner predicted by Douhet and his
disciples. Strategic bombing adherents continually attributed
air power's lack of decisiveness to factors beyond the control
of planners and operators. 7 ' However, in the fall of 1990
Saddam Hussein provided the U.S. Air Force with a chance to
validate its strategic bombing doctrine.
The original plan for the air campaign against Iraq, known
as Instant Thunder, was approved by General Norman Schwarzkopf
on 10 August 1990. 7i The plan was a classic expression of
strategic bombing principles. Instant Thunder was designed to
occur in three phases. The first phase established air
superiority over the Iraq-Kuwait theater. The target list
included traditional counterair targets (e.g., airfields and
76. See Maj Earl H. Tilford, Jr. "The Right Reaction: A
Consideration of Three Revisionists, " Airpower Journal , Summer
1989, pp. 72-79.
77. For example see Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for
Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press,
1978) .
78. Edward N\ Luttwak, "Air Power in U.S. Military
Strategy, " in The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the
Gulf War, p. 25.
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military C 2 facilities) as well as air defense weapons
systems. The second phase of the campaign targeted military-
related and civilian infrastructure as well as defense
industries. This phase, the most intensive, targeted the
Iraqi war-fighting capability and will. Phase three turned to
Iraq's fielded forces with interdiction and close-air mis-
sions. The entire campaign was expected to be completed in a
matter of weeks. 79
The results of the 40 day long aerial assault were truly
impressive. Iraq was left with little means to resist a
coalition ground offensive. General Merrill A. McPeak, Air
Force Chief of Staff claimed, "This is the first time in
history that a field army has been defeated by air power." 80
Air power advocates proclaim that Desert Storm marks a
watershed in how wars will be fought. Lt Col Price Bingham
went as far as to state that:
Perhaps the most important lesson the U.S. military could
learn from Desert Storm is that it needs to change its
doctrine to recognize that air power can dominate modern
conventional war .... surf ace forces are still very
79. In fact, all three phases were carried out simulta-
neously because of the abundance of aircraft available to
coalition air commanders. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
80. Quoted in Julie Bird, "McPeak: ' Brilliant .... air
deception,'" Air Force Timers, 25 March 1991, p. 8.
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important, but campaign success now depends on superiority
in the air more than it does on surface superiority. 81
Although some air power advocates may have exaggerated the
implications of the Desert Storm air campaign, there is little
doubt that Instant Thunder was vital to the achievement of
victory in the Gulf War. The unprecedented success of an air
power campaign founded on the assumptions of strategic bombing
has given, to those who seek it, an ultimate validation to the
model. For those strategic bombing advocates who foundered
during the 20 years after the Vietnam War, Desert Storm




The strategic bombing paradigm is the result of over 70
years of doctrinal development and refinement. The model's
roots lie in the work of air power theorist Giulio Douhet.
American air strategists adopted Douhet ' s assertions and
applied them in every major air campaign since World War II.
Strategic bombing adherents have continually maintained the
efficacy of the model even when faced with its limitations.
81. Lt Col Price T. Bingham, "Air Power in Desert Storm
and the Need for Doctrinal Change," Airpower Journal, Winter
1991, p. 33.
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For air power advocates, the Desert Storm air campaign serves
as the ultimate validation of strategic bombing principles.
45
IV. STRATEGIC BOMBING AND LOW- INTENSITY CONFLICT
This chapter begins with a discussion of the emerging
international security environment that emphasizes the growing
relevance of low-intensity conflict to U.S. national security
interests. It then examines the nature of LIC and argues
against the use of the strategic bombing model in this
environment. Two characteristics of low-intensity conflict
undermine the strategic bomb*ing model: (1) the vital center of
gravity in LIC is social-political in nature, it is not
embodied in the enemy's leadership element; and (2) the tradi-
tional targets for a strategic air campaign are too diffuse
and abstract within a LIC scenario to be attacked effectively
by air power.
A. THE EMERGING SECURITY POSTURE
The collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 brought the
Cold War to a close and altered the security environment
facing the United States like no other single event since
World War II. Containment of communism is no longer the
primary focus for U.S. military doctrine and strategy. Now
American policymakers are calling on the U.S. military estab-
lishment to train for and conduct operations that have never
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been considered part of the military's domain. In a realm
termed low-intensity conflict, American armed forces are
carrying out an increasingly diverse set of new missions.
Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military
Operations in Low Intensity Conflict , defines LIC as "politi-
cal-military confrontation between contending states or groups
below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful
competition among states." 82 The actors in LIC tend to be
non-government organizations (NGOs) vying with an established
government for power or operating outside the bounds of
institutionalized law. Rather than seeking to change the
existing system from within, LIC actors demand a novel social-
political organization or structure. 8 " Low-intensity con-
flicts are often viewed as sources of instability rather than
open warfare. 84
The new international community, with its emphasis on open
borders and free markets, provides an environment in which the
82. Field Manual (FM) 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet (AFP)
3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washing-
ton, DC: Departments of the Army and Air Force, 1990), p. 1-1.
83. See Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed.
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 116-121.
84. Sam C. Sarkesian, "The American Response to Low-
Intensity Conflict: The Formative Period," in Armies in Low-
Intensity Conflict .' A Comparative Analysis , eds . David
Charters and Maurice Tugwell (London: Brassey's Defense
Publishers, 1989), p. 45."
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LIC actor can operate with more freedom than ever before. As
international interdependence grows, a given source of
instability will produce negative effects within a wider and
wider circle of influence. As such, the LIC threat presents
itself as an increasingly important factor in the U.S.
security picture.
B. THE NATURE OF LOW- INTENSITY CONFLICT
The assumptions underlying the strategic bombing model
make it an inappropriate framework for the application of air
power in LIC operations. The strategic bombing model is based
on the premise that the most vital center is enemy leadership.
In LIC, the vital center of' the conflict lies within the
social-political fabric of the affected state. Furthermore,
targets struck in a strategic air campaign are less tangible
than those found in the conventional environment.
1. The Vital Center in LIC
The strategic bombing model reflects Sam Sarkesian's
assertion that the primary tenet of American military doctrine
has been the capability to bring superior firepower to bear on
the enemy. Sarkesian observes that
In the American scheme of things, war tends to be viewed
as a technological and managerial conflict, in which face-
to-face combat and conflict involving masses of troops
engaged against each other is, in the main, subordinate to
the ability to bring to bear sophisticated weapons on the
battlefield through electronic commands and machine
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oriented strategy and tactics to disrupt enemy-
formations . 85
This view is inappropriate for the low-intensity conflict
because the center of gravity of the contest lies not on the
battlefield but with some issue within the social-political
system. 86
Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military
Operations in Low Intensity Conflict , states "Chief among the
dynamic forces that contribute to LIC are change, discontent,
poverty, violence, and instability." 8 ' Many social
scientists have chronicled how social-political forces can
generate conflict classified as LIC. 88 Insurgencies in
85. Sam C . Sarkesian, "Low-Intensity Conflict : Concepts,
Principles, and Policy Guidelines," in Low-Intensity Conflict
and Modern Technology, ed. Lt Col David J. Dean (Maxwell AFB,
AL : Air University Press, 1986), p. 14.
86. For accounts of how the U.S. Army suffers from this
same operational bias see Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army
and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD : Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986) and David W. Hogan,
•
Raiders or Elite Infantry?: The
Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992).
87. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, p. 1-2.
88. For example see Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nation-
alism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary
China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962); Samuel
P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); James C. Scott, The
Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in
Southeast Asia (New'Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976);
and Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989).
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Vietnam, El Salvador and Great Britain were all the result of
a perceived ineffective and/or oppressive regime. Peacemaking
operations in Cambodia and Somalia were required because
failed states resulted in the resurgence of inter-ethnic
strife. The campesinos of Bolivia and Peru who grow coca do
so because it is their only viable means to earn a living.
Some social-political ill is always the source of conflict in
LIC and it is this very issue that represents the vital center
of gravity in LIC.
The government is most often blamed for social-politi-
cal problems. Therefore, any application of military force by
the government (or in support of it) must be carried out
delicately. The most likely result of heavy-handed tactics,
designed to force LIC actors into submission, is aggravation
of an already volatile situation. LIC campaigns that do not
address, or at least recognize, the underlying issue (s)
generating instability are doomed to failure from the start.
2 . Leadership in LIC
The strategic bombing model dictates that an enemy's
"command element ; is the most important target of a military
campaign. However, in LIC, the leadership element is nebulous
and/or very difficult to target. Attempting to resolve the
conflict by applying pressure to this inherently amorphous
50
center of gravity will therefore prove ineffective or even
counter-productive
.
LIC is carried out by organizations similar to what
Ken Jowitt terms "Movements of Rage;
"
Movements of Rage are nihilistic political responses to
failure; the failure of the "Third World" to create
productive economies, equitable societies, ethical elites,
and sovereign nations. They are desperate responses to
the fact that nothing seems to work. 89
This type of organization is not susceptible to pressure
placed on its "leadership" for several reasons. First of all,
it is a grass-roots movement . If the current leaders appear
to waiver from stated goals or lean toward compromise, they
will be replaced. 91 Second, the movement's driving ideology
is highly emotional. LIC actors often rely on superficial,
emotional appeals to stimulate their members. 91 Therefore,
LIC actors are not generally disposed to compromise or
accommodation. In fact, they usually possess a "do or die"
mentality. 92 Finally, applying pressure to the leadership
89. Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinc-
tion (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992),
p. 275.
90. J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1979
(Dublin: Poolbeg Publishers., 1990), pp. 363-367.
91. See Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist
Insurgency : The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York, NY:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966), pp. 21-23.
92. For example see Che Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare
(New York, NY: Praeger, 1961), pp. 11-12.
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element of a LIC organization generates hostility from neutral
or outside parties because LIC actors portray themselves as
raising legitimate grievances. For instance, if a revolution-
ary movement claims to be fighting for even income distribu-
tion, the general populace will view any bid to degrade the
group's ability to carry on the conflict as persecution of
their "saviors." 93
Employing air power to pressure leadership into making
concessions has proven ineffective in the LIC environment. On
14 April 1986, Air Force and Navy fighter-bombers took part in
an attack on Libya known as Operation El Dorado Canyon. In
this classic application of strategic bombing, planners
selected targets to degrade Colonel Muammar Qadhafi's capabil-
ity and will to support terrorist activity against American
targets. 94 Citing an immediate drop in the level of
terrorist attacks carried out against Americans, El Dorado
Canyon was touted as a success by U.S. civilian and military
leaders (especially Air Force leadership). Yet, within five
months, Americans were again becoming targets for terrorist
93. Bynum E. Weathers, "Factors Affecting the Emergence
of Low-Intensity Conflict in Latin America, " in Low-Intensity
Conflict in the Third World, ed. Lewis B. Ware (Maxwell AFB,
AL : Air University Press, August 1988), p. 85.
94. White House Statement - 14 April 1986, p. 1.
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attacks. 9 ' Not only did this approach fail to accomplish its
stated objectives but also did little to address the underly-
ing reason why Americans were the target of terrorist attacks.
3. Production and Infrastructure in Lie
Strategic bombing advocates assert the swiftest route
to victory is to strike the enemy's production and infrastruc-
ture centers of gravity. This method of attack degrades the
enemy's capability to wage war and erodes their will to fight.
However, the means of production and infrastructure in the LIC
environment are most often too primitive to be targeted effec-
tively .
Resources, in the form of food and manpower, are
frequently "produced" through coercive taxation of the local
population. 9 * Targeting this source of production is morally
and tactically impossible. LIC actors also routinely procure
weapons and munitions on the "black" market or they simply
steal them. 97 As a result, there is no practical way to
target this type of supply line with aircraft.
95. Stewart Powell, "Terrorism's Grim Upsurge," U.S.
News and World Report, 2 2 September 1986, pp. 32-35.
96. Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political
Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1979), pp. 224-227.
97. Bell, pp. 4-6, 370-374, 392, 398, 436-440, 446.
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Infrastructure generally consists of dirt paths and
roads through rough terrain or small overgrown waterways.
Human and animal labor are usually employed to transport
equipment and supplies. 98 If accurate intelligence is
available to determine which routes are used, aerial attack
results in the creation of redundant routing. Furthermore,
the damage done to primitive roadways by bombing is minimal
and easily repaired." Targeting these forms of "industry
and transportation" is not only marginally effective, it also
tends to generate a political "backlash" within the local
populace that further aggravates the conflict to the advantage
of the rebellion and the detriment of the government.
Operation Rolling Thunder was designed to destroy
North Vietnam's capability and will to support the Vietcong
war effort by targeting the North's industry and infrastruc-
ture. Operating under the flawed assumption that the Vietcong
insurgency could not survive without large doses of support
from the North Vietnam, 10 ° campaign planners targeted North
Vietnamese highways, bridges, electric generating plants and
oil production facilities in an attempt tc end this "support."
98. Jon M. Van Dyke, North Vietnam' s Strategy for
Survival (Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Books, 1972), pp. 34-43.
99. Ibid., pp. 44-45, 48-49.
100. See Note #65.
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For three years, American and South Vietnamese bombers carried
out the strategic air campaign against North Vietnam.
Throughout the operation, Air Force leadership proclaimed the
efficacy of bombing North Vietnamese targets. However, the
Tet Offensive, on 30 January 1968, served as testimony to
Rolling Thunder's actual effectiveness. Relying on strategic
bombing to resolve the conflict in Vietnam distracted civilian
and military leadership from developing a comprehensive
program to address the underlying social and political issues
that were the source of unrest in Vietnam--mainly a brutal,
ineffective South Vietnamese government.
4. Population in LIC
According to the strategic bombing model, attacks on
enemy centers of gravity should be designed to disrupt the
lives of the general population. The model assumes that
disruption of their daily routines will cause the populace to
apply political pressure on the leadership element to end the
conflict. However, the nature of LIC is such that the
populace is already under considerable stress. Low-intensity
conflicts are generally manifestations of groups seeking
relief from that stress. Putting more pressure on the




Another characteristic of low-intensity conflict is
the blurring of lines between innocent civilians and fielded
forces. Timothy Wickham-Crowley writes that
In modern conventional war. . .combatants, civilian popula-
tions, and support systems are clearly defined. In
situations of guerrilla warfare--and Vietnam serves as the
clearest case--fche distinction between combatant and
civilian is intentionally'blurred by the guerrilla fighter
[emphasis added]. 101
Unfortunately, governments often take a "direct approach" when
targeting civilians in the low-intensity environment because
of the inability to distinguish between rebel and innocent
civilian. Although not practiced by U.S. forces, a government
conducting counterinsurgency operations, with significant aid
from the American military, recently resorted to this tactic.
In 1984, the Salvadoran Air Force carried out a bombing
campaign which indiscriminately targeted both guerrillas and
the local populace in areas deemed sympathetic to the
Farabundo Marti Front of the National Liberation (FMLN). 102
Any application of air power which targets the civilian
populace directly totally undermines the broader LIC campaign.
101. Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution:
Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory
(New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991), pp. 82-83.
102. Suzanne M. Heigh, "Counterinsurgency Strategies for
Effective Conflict Termination: U.S. Strategies in El Salva-
dor," Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, 1990, p. 155.
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5. Fielded Forces in LIC
The rebel often begins the conflict in a position
inferior to the government's in terms of resources and
firepower. In this sense, LIC pits the weak against the
strong. Throughout the history of armed conflict, when one
side has been at a rather large disadvantage in terms of
military strength, it has migrated toward tactics known
broadly as guerrilla warfare. 103 Indeed, guerrilla warfare
appears to be a common factor in every form of modern low-
intensity conflict. Peacekeepers in Somalia and Cambodia,
peacemakers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and counter-drug teams
throughout the Andean region all face a guerrilla threat.
Terrorists practice their own brand of guerrilla warfare known
as "urban guerrilla war" and counter-guerrilla operations are
"a given" in counterinsurgency
.
The prevalence of guerrilla warfare in LIC poses a
problem for air power. From the earliest attempts to do so,
the use of aircraft to conduct offensive operations against
guerrillas has proven futile. Guerrillas choose the time and
the place to fight. They travel in formations too small to be
acquired visually from the air. Or, as previously discussed,
guerrillas look too much like the civilian populace to be
103. See Lewis H. Gann, Guerrillas in History (Stanford,
CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971).
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reliably targeted from the air. Only when guerrilla forces
engage friendly ground forces can they be targeted by air-
craft .
From 1927 to 1933, the U.S. Marines used aircraft in
counterinsurgency operations against Augusto Sandino in
Nicaragua. Marine Corp aviators scored an initial success, in
November 1927, when they Surprised rebel troops at a main
guerrilla stronghold. 104 However, after this costly mistake,
Sandino 's troops turned to hit-and-run tactics and avoided
concentrating in large encampments. 105 The guerrillas were
never again targeted effectively by aircraft for the remainder
of the American presence in Nicaragua unless they were engaged
in open operations against friendly ground forces. 106
C. SUMMARY
Within the security environment emerging in the wake of
the Cold War, the U.S. military is going to be tasked with a
greater role in low-intensity conflict. The traditional
framework for the application of air power--strategic
104. Capt Kenneth A. Jennings, "Sandino Against the
Marines," Air University Review, July-August 1986, pp. 86-88.
105. Ibid., p. 92.
106. Ibid.
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bombing--is inappropriate for LIC operations. This is so
because strategic bombing ignores the social-political nature
of LIC. Also, the targets struck in strategic air campaigns
are diffuse, amorphous, or non-existent in the low-intensity
environment. Strategic bombing is therefore more counter-
productive than it is effective when applied to a low-intensi-
ty conflict scenario.
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V. EMPLOYING AIR POWER IN LOW- INTENSITY CONFLICT
In 1970, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf published an essay
on the nature of insurgent conflicts. 107 Leites and Wolf
developed a systemic model for insurgency that can be general-
ized to other categories of LIC
.
108 They outlined a strategy
for defeating insurgent systems by focusing on their vulnera-
bilities. In essence, they provided a framework for LIC
operations that attacks the opponent's centers of gravity.
Air power can make vital contributions within this framework,
but its application focuses more on the airplane's ability to
support ground operations and less on its capability to carry
and drop ordnance.
A. LEITES AND WOLF: A NEW FRAMEWORK
In 1970, Leites and Wolf published Rebellion and Authori-
ty. The study described emerging rebellion as a system and an
107. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and
Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago,
IL: Markham Publishing Company, 1970)
.
108. A survey of actors in the various categories of LIC
demonstrates that they share many common traits--similar
organizational structures, employment of violence and coer-
cion, a passionate' ideology, and use of social-political
grievances to legitimate their existence and methods. For
instance see FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, pp. 2-0 - 2-7, 3-1 - 3-6.
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organizational technique, and explained the process of
countering a rebellion in terms of weakening its organization
while strengthening the structure of local authority. 109 The
Leites and Wolf framework ^targets the rebel organization's
centers of gravity and addresses the underlying social-
political causes of unrest. They outlined four methods to
defeat a rebellion that combine to make up a comprehensive
low-intensity campaign.
1. LIC as a System
Leites and Wolf based their model on the primary
assumption that "movements, as operating systems, require that
certain inputs be converted into certain outputs, or activi-
ties." 110 A LIC "system" must receive inputs, in the form of
money, manpower, supplies and intelligence, in order to
survive. These inputs come from both inside (endogeny) and
outside (exogeny) the relevant theater. 111 For a movement in
its infancy, endogenous inputs are usually limited to food,
recruits, and some level of tolerance by the civilian popu-
lace. However, as the system matures , endogenous inputs take
the form of political support and loyalty. Initially food and
recruits are gained through coercion or payment . As the
movement develops momentum, the rebel organization attempts to
109. Leites and Wolf, p. 4
110. Ibid., p. 32.















Figure 2 . Inaurgency as a System
(Rebellion and Authority, p. 35)
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persuade the general populace to provide support without
payment or coercion. 112 Many systems receive some degree of
support from external sources. This form of support is
predominately financial and logistic support and tends to
taper off as the system matures. 113
To endure, the LIC system must convert inputs to
useful, effective outputs. Leites and Wolf assert that an
efficient organization is the key to an effective "conversion
mechanism." 114 Such an organization requires branches
dedicated to personnel, financial, and logistic matters, as
well as intelligence, communications, and operations. A LIC
system must maintain a bureaucracy that mirrors the
government's civilian and military administrations to generate
effective outputs.
Outputs are designed to perform one of two functions:
(1) attack the government, or (2) generate support for the
system. 115 For instance, a propaganda campaign accusing
local officials of corruption may be devised to undermine the
government's credibility. Alternatively, a guerrilla offen-
sive could be carried out to attrite government security forc-
es. Rebels also generate "positive" outputs in order to gain
112. Leites and Wolf, p. 33
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid., p. 34.
115. Ibid.
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popular support. They build schools and clinics in rural
villages. They also provide basic services like arbitration
in local disputes, which government institutions are too
distant or unconcerned to deliver. Effective outputs build
support for the LIC actor and weaken the established govern-
ment .
2 . Countering the LIC System
Conceptualizing the LIC threat as a dynamic, systemic
process allows the strategist to visualize several areas where
the mechanism can be "broken." Leites and Wolf outlined four
"tasks" that make up a comprehensive LIC campaign: (1) inter-
dict inputs, (2) disrupt the conversion process, (3) reduce
outputs, and (4) build the government's resistance to the LIC
actor. Each component of this approach attacks the LIC system
by applying pressure where it is especially vulnerable. In
other words, Leites and Wolf identified and targeted the
centers of gravity in low-intensity conflict.
Although the strategy that Leites and Wolf outline
shares the same underlying tenet as strategic bombing (i.e.,
attacking the enemy's centers of gravity), they recognized
that LIC and conventional operations cannot be carried out by
the same means
:
The types of force, and 'the types of political actions
that are most relevant in determining outcomes, are likely
to differ significantly between [low-intensity conflict]
and other wars. Military techniques that work effectively
in [LIC] are not likely to be effective in other wars, and
political techniques and strategies that work in [LIC] are
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likely to differ from those that work in other kinds of
war. 116
Leites and Wolf viewed countering the LIC threat more as
police work than as traditional military operations. 117
However, they maintain that LIC campaigns can, and should, be
carried out by military forces--as long as the military
recognizes that LIC operations require a different frame of
reference than conventional warfare. 118 Leites and Wolf also
recognize the need to address the social-political issue (s)
causing unrest when developing a LIC campaign. 119
a. Interdicting Inputs
Targeting inputs means raising the unit cost of
available resources or simply reducing the amount of resources
available to the LIC system. According to Leites and Wolf,
methods of input interdiction include "construction of
barriers that impede the movement of people or supplies from
a source to a destination; and preemptive buying programs that
try to engage the available suppliers of particular inputs so
that these goods are less readily available." 120 A
successful campaign of input interdiction causes the system to
116. Ibid., p. 72.
117. Ibid., p. 74.
118. Ibid., pp. 137-139.
119. Ibid., pp. 73-74, 83
120. Ibid., p. 36.
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divert some of its energy from generating outputs to dealing
with "production" issues. 121 The "Malayan Emergency"
provides an example of successful input interdiction. In
1952, the British took aim to hamper the Malayan People's
Liberation Army (MPLA) guerrillas by denying them access to
food produced by the local populace. All sales of food items
were strictly monitored and recorded; canned goods were opened
upon their purchase; meals were served en masse under police
supervision; and field workers were searched for food upon
entering and leaving their villages. 122 The effectiveness of
this campaign was evidenced by a marked decrease in guerrilla
activity and the large number of subsistence farms that sprang
into existence in communist*-he Id territory. 123
b. Disrupting Conversion
Targeting the LIC system's conversion mechanism
means disrupting its organization. Leites and Wolf listed the
following techniques for reducing a LIC organization's effi-
ciency: "creating distrust and frictions within [the] organi-
zation by planting rumors; attracting defectors (particularly
121. Ibid., p. 77.
122. See Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla
Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989), . pp. 166-168 and John Coates,
Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency,
1948-1954 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 150-157.
123. Cable, Conflict of Myths, p. 87.
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those from the higher ranks in [the] organization) ; dissemi-
nating credible misinformation about the behavior of [the
group's] leadership; and generally raising the noise level in
[the group's] information system." 124 A most effective means
to disrupt the LIC organization is the waging of propaganda
campaigns that portray the rebel's life as harsh and simulta-
neously make the option to defect appear attractive through
incentives. 125 In the early 1980s, the Italian government
achieved a dramatic success with a campaign of this sort
directed against the Red Brigade terrorist organization. In
December 1979, the Italian government announced sharp increas-
es in the punishment for individuals convicted of terrorist
crimes, while, at the same time, offering light sentences to
Red Brigade members who cooperated with the police. 126
Terrorists who turned themselves in, known as the pentiti (or
the repentant)
,
provided information to police that devastated
the Red Brigade and accelerated its downfall. 127
c. Reducing Outputs
In the Leites and Wolf framework, targeting
outputs comes closest to a conventional role for military
124. Leites and Wolf, p. 36.
125. Ibid., p. 80.
126. Richard Drake, The Revolutionary Mystique and
Terrorism in Contemporary Italy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1989), p. 105.
127. Ibid., pp. 135-152.
67
assets. The application of military might is implied by the
counter-force operations necessary to attack system outputs.
However, Leites and Wolf maintained that, in the LIC arena,
"the application of firepower from ground and air .. .depends
especially on accurate intelligence, so that targeting error
in the use of such firepower is reduced." 128 Leites and Wolf
affirmed that because of the political nature of low-intensity
operations "obtaining information that enables key figures in
the movement to be seized or eliminated may be... more
important ... in [LIC] than in conventional conflicts." 129 The
most effective counter-force campaign targets the LIC
organization's cadre for capture. The Phoenix program in
Vietnam represents just such a campaign. Carried out from
1967 to 1972, Phoenix targeted the Vietcong infrastructure
through the use of intelligence information (mostly gained
from recent Vietcong defectors) . Although Phoenix's ultimate
success was limited by several factors (e.g., abusive and
incompetent South Vietnamese interrogators), it remains a
model for the type of counter-force campaign that Leites and
Wolf suggested. 130
128. Leites and Wo f, p. 36.
129. Ibid., p. 82.
130. For a detailed analysis of the successes and
failures of Phoenix see Dale Andrade, Ashes to Ashes: The
Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1990) . For a personal account of one Phoenix advisor's
experiences in the field, s.ee Stuart Herrington, Silence Was
A Weapon: The Vietnam War in the Villages (New York, NY: Ivy
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d. Strengthening Government
Leites and Wolf outlined several methods to
strengthen the government is resistance to a LIC threat.
Defensive measures (physical fortifications and barriers as
well as increasing the size and capability of security forces)
are only part of the answer. 131 The most important and most
efficient means available to thwart any LIC threat is to
increase the effectiveness of government
:
[T]he basic requirement for increasing absorptive capacity
for the rebellion's outputs is to strengthen authority
itself: its capacity to be informed, undertake programs,
control, protect, punish, and act and react vigorously,
quickly, and intelligently. 132
This approach not only forces the government to acknowledge
and deal with the root cause of the conflict, it also
increases the government's capability to do so. A government
able to administer effective political, social, and economic
programs can contend with most of the problems that cause low-
intensity conflict. Methods for fortifying a government
include training programs to "professionalize" the military,
foreign aid packages to deal with external debt, and agricul-
tural and industrialization programs designed to help the
country support itself. A comprehensive campaign employing
these techniques, termed Internal Defense and Development
Books, 1982)
.
131. Leites and Wolf, p. 37
132. Ibid., p. 83.
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(IDAD) Strategy, is outlined in FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 Military
Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict . This strategy inte-
grates civilian and military training with aid programs. 133
The primary aim of the IDAD strategy is to increase government
efficiency. 134 IDAD also places a premium on including the
civilian populace in the planning and enactment of development
programs which "target" the specific social-political problems
that are potential sources of unrest. 135
B. THE PROPER ROLE FOR AIR POWER IN LIC
One of the most entrenched biases of strategic bombing
enthusiasts is that aircraft are best employed as weapons. 136
This "shooter" mentality has developed from the strategic
bombing model's emphasis on selecting and destroying targets.
Such a frame of reference is a hindrance to operations in a
LIC campaign. First of all, as highlighted earlier, the
available targets in LIC cannot be struck effectively by
aircraft. Secondly, if the main efforts to defeat the LIC
actor are accomplished on the ground, then the primary role
for air power should be to support these operations. In a LIC
campaign modeled after the Leites and Wolf framework, air
133. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, p. 2-7.
134. Ibid., p. 2-8.
135. Ibid., pp. 2-8-2-9.
136. For an example of this type of bias see Warden, The
Air Campaign.
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power has five primary missions: reconnaissance and surveil-
lance (RECCE); psychological operations (PSYOPS); maintenance
of air lines of communication (ALOC) ; close air support (CAS)
;
and support of civil action programs. None of these missions
reflect the traditional role for air power envisioned for
conventional warfare. However, they are all vital, effective
contributions to a comprehensive low-intensity campaign.
1. Reconnaissance and Surveillance
The RECCE mission furnishes timely intelligence
necessary for effective, accurate application of military
firepower. As stated earlier, accurate intelligence is
particularly important in the LIC environment because of the
difficulty in distinguishing between innocent civilians and
combatants. The ant i -Communist campaign against the "Huks" in
the Philippines (1946-1954) provides an example of the
successful use of RECCE aircraft to support a LIC campaign.
Specially designed battalion combat teams (BCTs) were used to
target guerrilla forces. The BCTs were composed of light
aircraft and small ground teams that would conduct combined,
clandestine reconnaissance operations to ensure that a
"targeted" village was indeed a guerrilla encampment. 137
Larger ground units would then attack the guerrilla camp with
137. Lt Col Tomas C. Tirona, "The Philippine Anti-
Communist Campaign, " Air University Quarterly Review, Summer
1954, p. 50.
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the support of "on-station" air cover provided by the recon-
naissance aircraft. 138 The operations carried out by these
special task forces were critical in convincing the Huk
guerrillas that violent rebellion was futile and that negotia-
tions with the government were in order. 139
2. Air Lines of Communication
The ALOC mission entails clandestine insertion of
ground teams and subsequent resupply for, and radio contact
with, these teams. ALOC aircraft represent the only link with
the "outside world" for these teams. ALOC can also allow
large formations to operate without the hindrance of a huge
logistical "tail." This allows greater freedom of action for
ground forces, especially in difficult terrain. During the
Greek Civil War, Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) pilots flew
most of their sorties in support of the Greek National Army
(GNA) . 140 ALOC sorties proved vital in resupplying the GNA
with food, medical supplies and ammunition. 141 Given the
rough, mountainous terrain and hazardous winter conditions,
the army's anti-guerrilla campaigns would have been impossible
138. Ibid.
139. Cable, Conflict of Myths, p. 61.
140. Lt Col M. A. Campbell, Lt Col E. W. Downs, and Lt
Col L. V. Schuetta, The Employment of Airpower in the Greek
Civil War, 1947-1949 (Maxwell AFB, AL : Aerospace Studies
Institute, 1964), p. 37.
141. Ibid., p. 41.
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without aerial resupply. 142 ALOC was a decisive factor in
the Greek Civil War. Aerial resupply allowed the GNA to
pursue the Communists into their mountain strongholds, where
the guerrillas were cut off from their own sources of material
and manpower. The GNA then simply pressed the attack until
the Communists could no longer resist. 143
3 . Close-Air Support
Much like the concept of close-air support that is
part of the strategic bombing model, CAS missions provide fire
support to ground troops when they encounter superior enemy
forces. In conventional operations, CAS is often part of a
combined offensive operation. In LIC, the majority of CAS
missions would be flown in response to requests by ground
forces in need of assistance." CAS aircraft might fly cover
sorties, in which they would loiter in a specific area
prepared to deliver firepower when needed, but they would not
generally carry out offensive operations. The emphasis on
minimizing the use of military firepower in LIC necessitates
a more reactionary posture than CAS assets would maintain in
a conventional conflict.
4. Psychological Operations
The first three LIC air missions discussed are all
primarily concerned with what Leites and Wolf would call
142. Ibid., pp. 43-47.
143. Ibid., p. 58.
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"output reduction" operations, that is attacking and capturing
the opponent's fielded forces. PSYOPS are concerned with
attacking the "conversion mechanism." PSYOPS missions include
leaflet drops, broadcasting from mounted loudspeaker systems,
and transmitting radio programs which deliver information to
the rebels or isolated members of the populace. In 1953,
during the Malayan Emergency, the Royal Air Force (RAF) began
using specially equipped aircraft to conduct psychological
operations against the MPLA guerrillas. Several loud-speaker
equipped aircraft formed a unit known as "Voice Flight." 144
The RAF "targeted" areas of known guerrilla concentrations
with messages designed to lower morale and encourage deser-
tion. The results of this campaign were dramatic: 70% of the
guerrillas who surrendered during the period in which Voice
Flight operated claimed to have been influenced by these
*
broadcasts . 145
5. Support of Civil Actions
Aircraft can play a vital role in civil action
designed to increase government effectiveness and legitimacy.
Aircraft can be employed to transport construction materials,
equipment, and manpower for development projects. They can
also transport medical supplies, technicians, and food in
144. Maj Arthur D. Barondes, The Accomplishments of
Airpower in the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) (Maxwell AFB,
AL: Aerospace Studies Institute, 1963), p. 58.
145. Ibid., p. 59.
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support of humanitarian and social welfare projects. Recent
examples of employing air power in this manner were carried
out by the United States European Command across the African
continent in early 1992. Army and Air National Guard units
conducted joint exercises which provided medical assistance,
repaired a hospital, and built clinics and schools in support
of social welfare programs. 14 *3 U.S. personnel also trained
local security forces in weapons handling, parachute jumping,
and performing humanitarian work. The training programs run
in Senegal, Guinea, Mali, and Botswana were aimed at develop-
ing non-politicized, professional militaries subordinate to
civilian authority and capable of contributing to social
development programs. 147
C. SUMMARY
The strategic bombing model is inappropriate for LIC
operations. This chapter has delivered an alternative frame-
work from which to plan LIC campaigns. Within this framework
air power can contribute vital support to LIC operations. Air
power has five primary missions in LIC: reconnaissance and
surveillance, psychological operations, maintenance of air
lines of communication, close air support, and support of
civil action programs. These missions reflect the premise
146. See William Matthews, "U.S. Military Shifts focus,
Resources to Africa" Air Force Times , 8 June 1992, p. 24.
147. Ibid.
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that within LIC the employment of air assets should focus more
on the airplane's ability to support ground operations and
less on its capability to carry and drop ordnance.
76
VI. CONCLUSION
In the scramble to react to the dramatic changes in the
domestic and international scenes of the late 1980s, the U.S.
Air Force has attempted to retain its traditional ways of
doing business. The "reorganization" plan focused primarily
on cutting costs by reducing personnel. The Air Force still
insists on developing and acquiring weapons systems
appropriate exclusively for the Cold War milieu. The danger
of behaving in this manner lies in the fact that many, if not
most, of the security challenges that the United States will
face in coming years will be distinctly different than
anything it has dealt with in the past. Therefore, the
greatest mistake Air Force -leadership can make is to rely on
a doctrine designed specifically for conventional war.
Credible evidence exists that the Air Force will indeed
make this mistake as it heads into the future security arena.
Since the first application of strategic bombing principles in
World War II, air power advocates have affirmed the
effectiveness of this model. They have attributed every
limitation and failure of the strategic bombing model to
"external" factors not under the control of planners and
operators. There are no indicators that the Air Force has
loosened its grip upon strategic bombing during the turmoil of
the late 1980s. In fact the^ Desert Storm air campaign in 1991
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served to validate the strategic bombing model and further
entrench its principles in the minds of American airmen.
American military involvement since Desert Storm indicates
that the United States will be getting involved in more and
more conflicts classified as low-intensity. If this is true
then the Air Force needs to evaluate its ability to operate
outside the tenets of strategic bombing. The nature of low-
intensity conflict undermines the strategic bombing model.
The "leadership element" in LIC scenarios is vastly different
than conventional conflict.. Attempts to pressure the enemy
leadership into submission will only further aggravate the
conflict. The traditional targets struck in strategic air
campaigns do not exist in the same manner as conventional
conflict. Production, infrastructure, and communication
networks are primitive or clandestine. Even the distinction
between enemy forces and innocent civilians is blurred. In
this environment strategic bombing cannot work.
The best answer to how to employ air power in low-
intensity conflict is to exploit the airplane's ability to
support ground operations. This includes combat operations in
the form of inserting small tactical ground teams, aerial
resupply and communication, and psychological operations. It
also means taking advantage of cargo aircraft to support civic
action programs. Air assets can be used to deliver
construction equipment and supplies as well as medical
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personnel to areas never before reached by government
institutions. This mission is key in low-intensity conflicts.
It is necessary to change the role for air power in order
to effectively employ air assets in low-intensity operations.
However, this change will prove a real burden to those who
have to convince traditional air power advocates it is needed.
The major barrier to employing air power in a manner
appropriate to LIC is the doctrinal inertia from 40 years of
preparation for war with the Soviet Union. During this time
the aircraft has been viewed as a weapon. Its other
capabilities were relegated to "auxiliary" missions. The fact
that air power's proper role in low-intensity conflict
downplays "shooter" missions is going to make for a "tough
sell" to traditional die-hards: The challenges, then, are for
those who recognize the wisdom of this approach to communicate
it to those who are locked into old modes of thinking; and for
those who are blind to the wisdom of this approach to open
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